











                                               1	Some	of	the	main	contributions	within	the	behavioral	economics	approach	to	BR	are	collected	in	Kahneman	and	Tversky	(2000),	Camerer,	Loewenstein	and	Rabin	(2004),	and	Lowenstein	(2007).	2	An	alternative	label	for	the	FFH	program	is	the	“simple	heuristics”	program.	However,	in	this	introduction	we	follow	the	terminology	adopted	by	some	of	the	contributors	to	the	present	issue	and	thus	use	the	FFH	label.	3	Some	significant	contributions	to	the	fast-and-frugal-heuristics	program	are	collected	in	Gigerenzer,	Todd,	and	the	ABC	Research	Group	(1999),	Gigerenzer	and	Selten	(2001),	Gigerenzer,	Hertwig	and	Pachur	(2011),	Todd,	Gigerenzer,	and	the	ABC	Research	Group	(2012).	
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“model-based	approach”	to	BR	(Manzini	and	Mariotti,	this	issue).	We	take	the	liberty	to	call	it	the	“heuristics-and-revealed-preference”	(HRP)	program,	as	this	name	seems	to	better	highlight	the	program’s	main	features.	As	in	the	first	two	approaches	to	BR,	decisions	are	conceived	as	determined	by	some	heuristic.	What	is	peculiar	to	the	heuristics-and-revealed-preference	program,	however,	is	that	the	choices	generated	by	a	given	heuristic	are	characterized	in	terms	of	axioms	of	revealed	preference.	The	characterizing	axiom	is	less	restrictive	than	the	Weak	or	Strong	Axioms	associated	with	rational	choices	but	still	rules	out	a	significant	array	of	choice	patterns.	For	instance,	in	the	“Categorize	Then	Choose”	model,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(2012)	conceive	decisions	as	the	result	of	a	two-stage	process.	In	the	first	stage,	the	decision	maker	categorizes	the	alternatives	in	broad	classes	and	focuses	on	one	class;	in	the	second	stage	he	chooses	an	alternative	from	that	class.	For	example,	the	decision	maker	first	categorizes	restaurants	by	type	of	cuisine	and	focuses	on,	say,	Mexican	restaurants;	then	he	chooses	the	preferred	Mexican	restaurant.	Manzini	and	Mariotti	show	that	if	an	agent	makes	decisions	according	to	a	Categorize-Then-Choose	heuristic,	then	his	choices	will	display	a	specific	consistency	feature	that	can	be	characterized	in	terms	of	a	revealed	preference	axiom	they	call	Weak	WARP.	The	HRP	program	offers	a	straightforward	way	to	test	experimentally	the	validity	of	a	BR	model:	if	the	choices	recorded	in	the	experiment	violate	the	consistency	features	characterizing	the	model	of	BR	under	test,	than	the	model	is	“falsified”.	In	our	example,	if	the	decision	maker’s	choices	violate	the	Weak	WARP,	this	suggests	that	he	does	not	decide	according	to	the	Categorize-Then-Choose	heuristic.4	Advocates	of	the	three	BR	programs	just	discussed	have	sometimes	been	critical	of	the	other	approaches.	The	oldest	and	probably	most	known	dispute	in	the	field	is	the	one	between	Gigerenzer	(1991,	1996)	and	other	supporters	of	the	FFH	program	on	the	one	side,	and	Kahneman	and	Tversky	(1996)	and	other	advocates	of	H&B	on	the	other	side.	At	the	descriptive	level,	Gigerenzer	has	argued	that	the	heurists	described	by	Kahneman	and	Tversky	are	too	vague	to	have	actual	explanatory	power. At	the	normative	level,	Gigerenzer	has	criticized	the	heuristic-and-biases	program	for	sticking	to	RCT	as	a	normative	model	of	rationality	(see	the	articles	by	Berg,	Katsikopoulos	and	Hands	in	this	issue,	Jullien	and	Vallois	2014,	and	Vranas	2000).	Berg,	also	an	exponent	of	the	fast-and-frugal-heuristics	program,	criticizes	Manzini	and	Mariotti’s	program	for	focusing	on	the	internal	consistency	of	the	decision	maker’s	choices,	as	expressed	by	some	axiom	of	revealed	preference,	as	the	unique	criterion	to	assess	and	characterize	his	bounded	rationality	(Berg,	this	issue).	In	turn,	exponents	of	the	HRP	program	criticize	the	decision	models	put	forward	in	the	other	two	approaches	because,	they	argue,	their	models	lack	precise	implications	in	terms	of	choice	data	and	therefore	cannot	be	falsified	in	laboratory	experiments	(see	Manzini	and	Mariotti	2007,	and	Spiegler	2008).	


























                                               7	As	we	have	seen,	in	Categorize	Then	Choose	the	agent	first	simplifies	his	choice	task	by	categorizing	the	alternatives	and	focusing	on	one	single	class,	and	then	chooses	the	most	preferred	alternative	from	that	class.	In	Rationalization,	the	agent	first	selects	the	alternatives	
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Parsimony.	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(this	issue)	suggest	that	parsimony	is	a	criterion	for	discriminating	between	observationally	equivalent	BR	models.	The	principle	of	parsimony	has	a	venerable	history	in	science.	In	its	formulation	as	Ockham’s	razor,	it	recommends	ontological	parsimony.	As	a	criterion	of	theory	choice	and	synonym	of	simplicity,	it	states	that	among	competing	theories	the	one	employing	the	fewer	assumptions	should	be	chosen,	ceteris	paribus.	Parsimony	is	often	taken	as	a	sign	of	truth,	but	why	it	is	so	remains	a	matter	of	philosophical	debate.	Alternatively,	it	is	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	predictive	accuracy.	To	illustrate	the	idea	behind	parsimony	as	a	criterion	of	selection,	Manzini	and	Mariotti	(this	issue)	take	Selten	(1991)’s	measure	of	predictive	success	as	an	example.	This	measure	ranks	models	according	to	their	descriptive	power	or	‘hit	rate’	(i.e.	the	proportion	of	observed	outcomes	consistent	with	the	model)	minus	their	‘relative	area’	(i.e.	the	proportion	of	theoretically	possible	outcomes	that	are	consistent	with	the	model).	The	adoption	of	Selten’s	measure	suggests	that	Manzini	and	Mariotti	interpret	parsimony	as	a	measure	of	predictive	accuracy	of	a	model	rather	than	of	its	truth.	So	interpreted,	Manzini	and	Mariotti’s	position	comes	close	to	Gigerenzer	and	colleagues’	complaint	about	the	fact	that	H&B	models	have	multiple	free	parameters	(see	Katsikopoulos,	this	issue).	The	idea	is	that	the	presence	of	many	free	parameters	runs	the	risk	of	overfitting	one’s	model	in	terms	of	a	particular	dataset	and	hence	to	make	it	a	poor	predictive	tool.	As	Forster	and	Sober	(1994)	point	out,	parsimony	can	mitigate	the	risk	of	overfitting	(for	discussion	in	the	context	of	BR	models,	see	e.g.	Gigerenzer	and	Brighton	2009).			
4.	Normative	issues	in	bounded	rationality	theories			Bounded	rationality,	although	bounded,	is	still	a	kind	of	rationality.	Consequently,	it	still	makes	normative	claims	–	how	one	ought	to	reason,	what	one	ought	to	do	–	only	within	its	bounds.	Some	of	the	contributors	to	this	issue,	for	example	Hands	and	Berg,	explicitly	endorse	this	position,	while	others,	for	example	Ross,	strenuously	seek	to	avoid	addressing	any	normative	implications	altogether.	We	leave	it	open	whether	the	concept	of	BR	necessarily	has	normative	implications.	Instead,	we	discuss	in	this	section	only	those	models	that	make	normative	claims.	The	question	that	arise	for	these	models	include	the	following:			 (i) What	are	the	normative	claims	of	bounded	rationality?	(ii) Is	bounded	rationality	normatively	less	valid	than	unbounded	rationality?	(iii) How	is	the	normative	validity	of	bounded	rationality	justified?		In	this	section,	we	survey	some	possible	answers	to	these	three	questions,	found	in	the	literature	on	rational	decision-making.	Not	all	of	them	were	intended	for	models	of	bounded	rationality,	but	rather	for	models	of	expected	utility	maximization.	Yet,	as	we	will	argue,	these	answers	can	be	applied,	mutatis	mutandis,	to	BR	as	well.	So	here	go	our	three	questions.	





stringency	of	internal	criteria,	might	satisfy	external	criteria	better	than	the	unbounded	model.	In	this	case,	the	BR	model	might	be	normatively	more	valid	than	the	unbounded	model.	For	example,	the	FFH	normative	model	is	based	on	external	criteria,	and	it	may	well	be	that	on	such	criteria	it	fares	better	than	the	unbounded	model	even	though	the	internal	criteria	of	the	FHH	model	are	less	stringent.	This	is	precisely	the	kind	of	claim	Berg	makes	in	his	contribution	to	this	issue.		 [table	1	here]		In	sum,	there	is	one	case	(A1)	in	which	the	unbounded	model	is	normatively	more	valid	than	the	BR	model	of	rationality,	given	that	both	models	are	based	on	the	same	kind	of	validity	criteria	and	all	the	criteria	by	which	the	unbounded	model	is	characterized	are	indeed	valid.	Conversely,	there	are	two	kinds	of	cases	(cases	A2,	&	B)	in	which	the	BR	model	might	be	more	valid	than	the	unbounded	model:	either	when	the	two	models	are	based	on	different	kinds	of	criteria,	or	when	they	are	based	on	the	same	kind	of	validity	criteria,	but	the	criteria	by	which	the	unbounded	model	is	characterized	are	not	valid.		(iii)	How	is	the	validity	of	bounded	rationality	justified?	So	far,	we	characterized	the	nature	of	normative	validity	criteria	and	the	consequences	for	both	models	of	bounded	and	unbounded	rationality.	In	this	section	we	instead	turn	to	the	methods	by	which	criteria	of	normative	validity	are	sought	to	be	justified	(see	Hands,	this	issue).8	We	distinguish	five	methods	of	validation	found	in	the	literature:		a. derived	from	conceptual	analysis;	b. derived	from	universal	loss-avoidance	considerations;	c. based	on	unambiguously	normatively	exemplary	empirical	cases;	d. derived	from	narrow	(d1)	and	wide	(d2)	reflective	equilibrium	between	intuitive	judgments	and	purported	principles;	e. inferential	coherence	meta-criteria.		We	briefly	describe	each	of	these	methods	in	turn.	Note	that	we	do	not	endorse	any	particular	method	of	validation.	The	point	is	to	map	the	conceptual	terrain	in	which	to	place	various	arguments	about	the	superior	validity	of	competing	models	of	rationality.		
a. Normative	validation	criteria	derived	from	conceptual	analysis	This	argument	for	the	normative	appropriateness	of	certain	internal	consistency	criteria	suggests	that	these	criteria	are	constitutive	of	the	meaning	of	preference,	belief	or	intention.	Take	for	example	preference	transitivity.	Drawing	an	analogy	to	length	measurement,	Davidson	(1976,	273)	asks:			 If	length	is	not	transitive,	what	does	it	mean	to	use	a	number	to	measure	length	at	all?	We	could	find	or	invent	an	answer,	but	unless	or	until	we	do,	we	must	strive	to	interpret	‘longer	than’	so	that	it	comes	out	transitive.	Similarly	for	‘preferred	to’.		



















e. Normative	validation	criteria	derived	from	inferential	coherence	meta-criteria	Thagard	(1982)	explicitly	criticizes	the	exemplary	cases	approach	(c)	and	the	equilibrium	approaches	(d1)	and	(d2)	as	inadequate	methods	to	get	from	the	psychology	of	reasoning	and	decision-making	to	normatively	valid	principles	of	deductive,	inductive	and	practical	reasoning.	Instead	of	relying	on	finding	some	equilibrium	between	the	various	reference	points	as	in	(d1)	and	(d2),	he	suggests	that	the	process	of	arriving	at	normatively	valid	criteria	of	reasoning	and	decision	making	should	be	governed	by	a	number	of	inferential	meta-criteria.	Specifically,	he	proposes	three	such	criteria:		 (1)	Robustness:	to	what	extent	do	the	normative	principles	account	for	inductive	practice?	(2)	Accommodation:	to	what	extent	do	background	theories	account	for	deviations	of	inductive	practice	from	the	normative	principles?	(3)	Efficacy:	given	background	theories,	to	what	extent	does	following	the	normative	principles	promote	the	satisfaction	of	the	inferential	goals?		The	third	meta-criterion,	in	particular,	distinguishes	Thagard’s	account	from	internalist	coherence	accounts	such	as	those	derived	from	conceptual	analysis	(a)	and	from	loss-avoidance	consideration	(b).	Furthermore,	this	account	differs	from	(d1)	and	(d2)	in	that	equilibrium	might	be	a	consequence	of	satisfying	these	meta-criteria,	but	it	need	not	be.	In	the	case	that	a	non-equilibrium	set	of	beliefs	better	satisfies	these	criteria	than	an	equilibrated	one,	the	former	should	be	chosen:			 Coherence	is	to	be	evaluated	according	to	criteria	to	which	the	achievement	of	reflective	equilibrium	is	irrelevant.	What	we	are	really	after	is	not	equilibrium,	but	progress:	the	development	of	better	and	better	inferential	systems.	(Thagard	1982,	39-40)		This	of	course	raises	the	question	how	these	meta-principles	themselves	are	justified.	Thagard	answers	with	a	strong	naturalist	position	on	normativity:	“What	in	turn	justifies	these?	They	seem	to	be	the	ones	actually	used	when	we	set	out	to	evaluate	inferential	practices”	(Thagard	1982,	40).	It	is	noteworthy	that	none	of	the	authors	contributing	to	this	issue	seeks	to	justify	the	normative	validity	of	their	respective	models	with	such	a	set	of	meta-criteria	of	coherence.			
5.	Concluding	remarks	
	In	this	introduction	we	examined	some	of	the	questions	concerning	the	descriptive	accuracy	and	normative	validity	of	alternative	approaches	to	bounded	rationality,	which	we	thought	were	raised	by	the	articles	collected	in	this	special	issue.	In	particular,	we	focused	on	ideas	about	the	relevance	of	different	kinds	of	evidence,	preferences	for	different	modelling	desiderata,	and	alternative	methods	for	the	justification	of	the	normativity	of	theories	of	rationality.	We	deliberately	refrained	from	taking	a	stance	in	favour	of	one	or	the	other	conception,	preference	or	justificatory	method.	Our	hope	is	
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that	the	special	issue	as	a	whole	will	contribute	to	stimulate	further	reflections	on	these	important	issues	among	philosophers	of	economics	and	practitioners.		
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Account	of	BR		
Account	of		
full	rationality	
Internal	consistency	
criteria	
External	performance	
criteria	
Internal	consistency	criteria	 (A1)	BR	less	valid,	because	BR	subject	to	lesser	degree	of	internal	consistency	(A2)	BR	more	valid	if	more	stringent	criteria	are	not	themselves	valid	
(B)	BR	sometimes	more	valid,	when	BR	gives	better	performance	results	than	full	internal	consistency	
Table	1:	Internal	consistency	and	external	performance	criteria			
